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Abstract
One determinant of peace is the role of women in society. Some studies suggest that a young age structure, 
also known as a “youth bulge” can facilitate conflict. Population growth and age structure are factors amenable 
to change in a human rights context. We propose that policies which favor voluntary family planning and 
the education of women can ameliorate the global burden of disease associated with conflict and terrorism.
Keywords: Population, Security, Conflict, Women, Family Planning, Iran
Copyright: © 2015 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: Potts M, Mahmood A, Graves AA. The pill is mightier than the sword. Int J Health Policy Manag. 
2015;4(8):507–510. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.109
*Correspondence to:
Alisha A. Graves
Email: agraves.oasis@gmail.com
Article History:
Received: 19 March 2015
Accepted: 31 May 2015
ePublished: 9 June 2015
  Perspective
The OASIS Initiative, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2015, 4(8), 507–510 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.109
ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Boko Haram in Nigeria all kill and injure people. Refugees from conflict and climate change are exposed to exploitation 
and death. Fighting causes additional mortality and morbidity 
by destroying the health care systems. Today’s battles differ 
from those in the past. At the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, 
40 000 men were killed or wounded but only one woman died 
from a stray bullet. Today, it is often women and children 
who suffer most from conflict. Poignantly, it is also women 
who hold a key to peace. The question is not, why does war 
break out? But, why does peace break out? We suggest that one 
factor in ameliorating the global burden of disease associated 
with conflict and terrorism is the increased role of women 
in society, enabled by policies related to family planning and 
women’s education.
Rapid population growth resulting in a distorted age 
structure is one of many factors associated with civil unrest 
and violence. Others include persistent poverty, repressive 
governance, food shortages, global economy, resource 
consumption, and extreme interpretations of religion. We 
argue that the biological, economic, and sociopolitical 
ramifications of the “youth bulge” resulting from rapid 
population growth are primary contributors to political 
conflict and terrorism – especially in environments with 
inadequate job opportunities. These ramifications warrant 
research attention and programmatic investment because they 
are most amenable to change from a human rights perspective 
through voluntary family planning and girls education.
The Biology of Violence
The overwhelming majority of soldiers, terrorists, criminals, 
European football hooligans, political radicals, rock stars, 
outstanding mathematicians, highest automobile insurance 
premium payers are men in the 15 to 29 years old age 
group. Men in their twenties also possess the highest 
testosterone levels,1 which are associated with dominance2 
and competition. Relative to married men at the same age, 
unmarried men have higher testosterone levels and are three 
times as likely to murder someone.3 Testosterone levels rise 
during competitive sports for both male players and fans – 
even among old men playing dominoes.4 High testosterone 
levels are also correlated with hedge fund managers’ risk 
taking on Wall Street.5 
The Demography of Violence
Populations with a low median age are often more conflict-
driven than those with a higher median age. Of the 800 000 
people murdered in 100 days in 1994 Rwanda, half of all adult 
men were in the 15 to 29 age cohort. In war torn Liberia the 
mean age of the population is 17, as opposed to 35 in the 
United States. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, 44% to 47% of all 
adults belong to this volatile age group. The 9/11 Commission 
Report points out how:
 “‘High birth rates…throughout the Moslem world’ have 
produced ‘a large, steadily increasing population of young 
men without any reasonable expectation of suitable 
or steady employment - a sure prescription for social 
turbulence.’’’6 
Mesquite and Weiner found the ratio of younger to older 
men accounted for about one-third of the variance in war and 
terrorism occurrences.7,8 While this may indicate a compelling 
relationship in social science terms, the impact of this ‘youth 
bulge’ is context-specific. In a socially homogenous society, 
such as South Korea or Taiwan, a youth bulge can help drive 
economic growth.9,10 However, a youth bulge can facilitate 
conflict in societies with ethnic and/or religious divisions, 
lack of education, employment opportunities, and healthcare. 
In Sri Lanka, Sinhalese political radicalism began in the 1950s 
and 60s as the ratio of men ages 15 to 29 exceeded 20% of the 
total Sinhalese population. The minority Tamil population’s 
violent response in the 1980s occurred precisely when the 
ratio of younger men to the total population of Tamils also 
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exceeded 20%.11 
Other factors skewing the population structure can also 
correlate with violence. In 19th century China, widespread 
female infanticide skewed the sex ratio as high as 129 males 
to 100 females. Unmarried men often formed bands of 
vagabonds.12 By contrast, in mid-nineteenth century England 
and Wales, many men had emigrated to the colonies and 
for the first time in history, 500 000 women did not marry 
and were not swept into a life of continuous child-rearing. 
Worsnop argues that these unmarried women were a driving 
force in establishing the professions such as nursing, making 
higher education accessible to women, and ultimately sparked 
calls for female equality.13 
The Case of Syria
The United Nations (UN) has declared Syria’s ongoing civil 
war as the “worst humanitarian crisis” with estimates of over 
200 000 dead, millions displaced in refugee camps, sectarian 
violence, and a broken healthcare system.14 The Assad 
regime’s failure to respond to extreme drought conditions 
and exploitative irrigation policies for government cronies 
left over 800 000 young, poor farmers unemployed.15 As 
unemployed farmers migrated with their families to Syrian 
cities, resources, education, and employment opportunities 
for the large incoming youth population were further 
strained. The Assad regime’s silencing of dissent, coupled 
with sectarian conflict, diminishing resources, ammunition 
from surrounding countries, and a fast-growing population 
eventually culminated in the Syrian revolution.15 Five years 
of Syria’s civil war have pulled thousands of young men 
into violence as a means of achieving economic security 
and political inclusion. Syrian women fleeing this violence 
suffer disproportionately in refugee camps, where they lack 
access to basic contraception.14 As a result, refugee camps are 
experiencing a rising incidence of unintended pregnancies 
and pregnancy complications.14
Connecting the Dots
During the Eisenhower administration, General William 
H. Draper Jr. emphasized the strategic significance of rapid 
population growth. Draper Jr. crafted many aspects of 
United States and international family planning assistance. 
In 1974, Henry Kissinger’s National Security Memo 200 
suggested expanding US aid assistance to international family 
planning. Vatican pressure has been credited with blocking 
the implementation of key recommendations.16 Forty years 
and 3.3 billion additional people later, the British Ministry 
of Defense argues that its military should understand 
demography and the importance of investing in women.17 
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, chaired 
by Sir Richard Ottaway, concluded:
“There is clear evidence that in many cases, high population 
growth in the developing world tends to correlate to political 
instability and to the spread of radical or extremist views….”17 
Women’s Empowerment
Women’s empowerment – or women’s freedom to make 
choices about their bodies and their lives – is fundamental 
for peace. Though African women are doing the majority of 
agricultural work, they are only given control over a small 
minority of capital resources. Each year, over 14 million 
girls under age 18 are married, many against their will.18 In 
Afghanistan, the Taliban even deny women access to a male 
doctor when complications arise in pregnancy. In 2012, 
Hudson et al, in a careful quantitative study confirmed that 
measures of the “the physical security of women [in a society] 
is strongly associated with the peacefulness of the state.”19 
Investing in girls’ education may be the most leveraged 
and cost effective investment a region in turmoil can make. 
Among other benefits, educated girls tend to marry later and 
have fewer children. Education, for good reason, is considered 
the primary driver of social and economic development. 
Nonetheless, Pakistan spends only 2.2% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) on education for its exploding population, 
leaving it with only approximately 30 000 madrassas, or 
religious schools, as sources for knowledge. Educating its 30 
million illiterate women would cost the Pakistani government 
approximately two billion dollars. By comparison, the new 
Joint Strike Fighter program costs about $200 billion – only to 
be used a few times in a shooting war, as opposed to education 
which lasts a lifetime. 
Access to Family Planning 
Access to family planning has a powerful impact on birth 
rates.20-25 Family size falls when women have the knowledge 
and means to separate sexual intercourse from childbearing. 
It is a common sense assertion, but often overlooked by 
influential economists and development strategists. Without 
use of contraception, the default position in any heterosexual 
partnership is a large family. Deciding on the size of one’s 
family depends on a conscious, persistent and often difficult 
effort to turn off fertility. 
Children in small families are more likely to enter school and 
stay in school than children in large families.26 In countries 
where the birth rate has fallen, children graduating from school 
are more likely to be employed as adults. In Egypt, 800 000 
young people enter the job market annually; however, the 
unemployed young men are called hayateen – “men who lean 
against walls.” They are tinder for extreme political teachings 
and fundamentalist religious sects. Falling family size pays an 
economic “demographic dividend,”9,10 at the national level, as 
savings rates increase when family size decreases. The “Asian 
tigers,” such as Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, have small 
families because in the 1960s their governments instituted 
organized family planning programs as a strategy to escape 
from poverty.
In countries where the couples’ desire to control their family 
size has been met with access to family planning, the birth 
rate has almost always fallen.23 Thailand and the Philippines 
have had the same population size since 1950. Thailand made 
contraception and safe abortion widely available, thereby 
decreasing the average number of children in a family from 
6 to 1.8. In the Philippines, religious barriers often prevent 
women from accessing contraception. Today, the average 
family has 3 children and the population is 96 million. Over 
time, a seemingly small difference in family size makes a 
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significant overall difference in population size. In 2050, 
Thailand is expected to have 61 million people and become 
a prosperous, democratic country. Without a major shift in 
population growth regulation policies and related services, the 
Philippines will have about 157 million people. This growth 
will outstrip the country’s ability to provide basic services 
and jobs, which we predict will ultimately lead to poverty and 
political instability. 
Unfortunately, in countries covering more than half of the 
world’s population, the range of family planning methods 
offered remains limited. Low-income women in developing 
countries face a great many unjustified barriers that often 
stand between them and accessing the fertility regulation 
technologies they need.27 For example, medical traditions 
commonly require women to attend a family planning clinic 
on the day she is menstruating in order to demonstrate that 
she is not pregnant. Barriers to family planning are a tangle of 
such details and often result in women having larger families 
than they desire.
The Experience of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen the most rapid decline 
in birth rates than any country on the planet. In the late 1980s, 
informed decision-makers understood that rapid population 
growth was outpacing growth in the GDP – a recipe for 
increased poverty. The religious leadership endorsed family 
planning on health grounds, Iran manufactured its own oral 
contraceptives and condoms, and offered vasectomies and 
female sterilization. Before young couples could marry, they 
were required to receive family planning instruction. In the 
decade 1986 to 1995, family size in Iran fell from 5.6 to 3.3 
children, and today it stands at 1.8. There are now more women 
than men in Iranian universities. However, a draconian new 
Comprehensive Population and Exaltation Family Bill aims to 
lower the age of marriage and outlaw voluntary sterilization. 
In 2013, over 270 000 girls aged 10 to 19 were married and 
several births to girls aged 10 were registered.28 
Conclusions
Family planning is about responding to what women want, 
and not telling them what to do. Just as forced or coercive 
contraception is cruel and unacceptable, so is forced 
pregnancy and childbearing due to lack of family planning. 
Family planning is natural and essential for modern living, as 
it allows societies to reach economic prosperity, security, and 
achieve sustainable population growth. Effective use of family 
planning can prevent skewed age structures that result in the 
“youth bulge,” which – among various external factors – is a 
precursor for violence. We invite others to examine further 
empirical evidence for this view and recommend that security 
experts consider girls education, family planning, and youth 
employment among their strategies. Through ensuring 
women the freedom and resources to make informed 
decisions about their body and family size, we expect to find 
that the pill is mightier than the sword. 
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